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INSTITUTIONAL STRESS AND THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: 
JUDICIAL EMERGENCIES, VERTICAL NORMS, AND PRETRIAL 
DISMISSALS 
 
Daniel J. Knudsen* 
 
This Article examines the effects of judicial emergencies on the 
federal district courts. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
declares judicial emergencies when a weighted statistic of filings and 
vacancy days exceeds certain thresholds. This Article presents evidence 
on the relationship between emergency status in a judicial circuit and the 
frequency of pretrial disposition in federal district courts within that 
circuit: a federal district court is statistically more likely to dismiss a 
case before trial if its corresponding circuit court is in emergency. This 
evidence suggests that emergency status may affect normative 
expectations between the federal district courts and the federal courts of 
appeals. Federal district courts in circuits under stress appear to 
increase their “gatekeeping” function by reducing the number of full 
trials that they hear. The evidence presented in this Article also suggests 
that the stability of vertical norms between the federal district courts and 
the federal circuit courts plays an important role in the federal district 
courts fulfilling their trial-like institutional role. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The federal district courts, and federal district-court judges, remain an 
undertheorized and understudied part of the federal judiciary.1 One important 
deficit is a lack of focus on institutional analysis. Indeed, “much of the existing 
empirical work on federal district courts has failed to take account of the 
institutional setting in which those judges operate.”2 This institutional setting is 
important. The federal district courts have jurisdiction over the vast majority of 
claims arising under federal law. When compared with the Supreme Court in terms 
of raw volume, the differences in filings are stark. The federal district courts 
                                                     
* © 2014 Daniel J. Knudsen. Knudsen is a 2012 graduate of Yale Law School and 
clerked in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The author wishes to 
thank Professor Christine Jolls for incomparable academic support, intellectual guidance, 
and research advice. The author also wishes to thank Miguel de Figueiredo for helpful 
conversations on statistical analysis, and much else. The views expressed in this Article are 
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1 See generally Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Court Decision-
Making? 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83 (2009) (detailing the lack of scholarship in this 
area). 
2 Id. at 84. 
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handle over 300,000 cases a year, compared to the federal circuit courts at 
approximately 50,000 cases a year, and the Supreme Court at around 75 cases a 
term.3 Almost one thousand judges make up 78% of the federal judiciary and 
oversee nearly 79% of cases in federal court.4 
A second important deficit that remains undertheorized and understudied is 
the interactions and hierarchies between the federal district courts and the federal 
circuit courts. The district courts constitute the first step in the process of 
lawmaking. By shaping factual and procedural records and taking the first pass at 
unsettled questions of law, the federal district courts are important determiners of 
what ultimately constitutes the law.  
This Article diminishes both of these research deficits and contributes to a 
deeper understanding of the district courts and district-court judges by examining 
the effects of institutional stress as measured by judicial emergencies, on case 
outcomes. The Article finds that vertical norms, that is, institutional relationships 
and understandings between the district and circuit courts, matter. Institutional 
stress in the federal circuit courts results in federal district-court judges more 
frequently disposing of cases on pretrial motions. This finding bolsters scholarship 
suggesting that the federal district courts are fast losing their character as trial 
courts.5 This Article’s finding also suggests that the institutional relationship 
between the federal district courts and the federal circuit courts may matter more 
than previously thought for district court decision making and for the maintenance 
of the federal judiciary as a deliberative institution. 
Despite the lack of scholarly attention, the federal district courts have unique 
judicial characteristics that make them important areas of study. One important 
difference between appellate courts and trial courts is the institutional setting in 
which they operate. Unlike justices on the Supreme Court or judges on federal 
circuit courts, federal district-court judges work alone on the bench.6 Thus, the 
constraining aspect of panel effects is not present. This in turn has ramifications for 
judicial accountability: panel effects can work to dampen ideological voting, while 
                                                     
3 See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE 
ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 132 (2010). The issue of the Supreme Court’s shrinking 
docket is also much discussed and analyzed. See, e.g., Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, 
Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1219, 
1276–78 (2012) (finding that an ideologically fractured court is likely to hear forty-two 
fewer cases based on data from 1940 to 2008). 
4 Kim, supra note 1, at 84. 
5 See Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District 
Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 745, 749 (2010) (describing a “move towards paper courts”). 
6 The one exception to this is the three-judge district panel, only used nowadays in 
legislative reapportionment cases. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 5 (1996) (“Behind the decline of the device is a desire to reduce 
the Supreme Court’s obligatory jurisdiction.”). 
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judges deciding alone face no such constraints.7 Other scholars point to panels as 
potentially polarizing. Panel effects are a complex issue, but the important point 
for district courts is that they are absent. District judges may face other constraints 
from colleagues, but these effects are likely more attenuated. 
The second important difference between appellate courts and trial courts is 
the procedural variety of federal district decision making. Federal district judges 
rule multiple times in the course of a lawsuit on numerous motions that affect the 
outcome. They also engage in fact finding more often than the federal circuit-court 
judges.8 These differences in judicial agency mean that the decision making 
behavior of federal district-court judges is cumulative and decisions may be 
influenced by previous decisions in the same case. This also means that judges 
evaluate their decisions on pretrial motions and evidentiary issues in light of other 
variables: relationships with repeat litigants, other judges’ decisions on preliminary 
short motions and matters, and in relation to other rulings on initial issues in 
disparate cases. 
Lastly, the institutional signaling that federal district courts engage in is 
different.9 Of particular interest is the institutional relationship between district-
court judges and federal circuit-court judges.10 The stability of this institutional 
                                                     
7 This idea is highlighted in CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 136 (2006) (“The presence of a potential 
dissenter—in the form of a judge appointed by a president from another political party—
creates a possible whistleblower, who can reduce the likelihood of an incorrect or lawless 
decision.”). 
8 Kim, supra note 1, at 84–85 (“Too often, studies of the district courts rely on an 
implicit assumption that judging at the trial court level is fundamentally the same as 
judging at the appellate level . . . . [T]his approach is misguided . . . . [U]nlike in the typical 
appellate case, a district judge may rule in a single case on multiple occasions and on 
different types of questions, only a few of which could be dispositive but all of which 
affect the case’s progress and ultimate outcome. Moreover, because many of the judge’s 
actions are taken in response to motions by the parties, there is no determinate sequence in 
which pretrial litigation events occur.”). 
9 For an example of this signaling, see Catherine T. Struve, Power, Protocol, and 
Practicality: Communications from the District Court During an Appeal, 84 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 2053 (2009) (demonstrating the circumstances, including when a district judge 
injects reasoning into a ruling, that inform the circuit court of the merits of the case’s 
review). 
10 Studies that attempt to examine this institutional relationship include scholarship 
about chief judges of the federal courts of appeals elevating federal district judges to meet 
overburdened caseloads. See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Distlear, Designated 
Diffidence: District Court Judges on the Courts of Appeals, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 565 
(2001); see also Sara C. Benesh, The Contribution of “Extra” Judges, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 
301, 310–14 (2006) (finding that, for the Ninth Circuit, elevated senior judges meet or 
exceed their expected workload relative to the sitting Circuit judges but that all elevated 
judges are reluctant to write separate opinions or dissent from their appellate-level 
colleagues). 
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relationship is important both from the perspective of litigants in the federal system 
and the judges themselves. 
This Article examines federal district-court case outcomes through the lens of 
the effects of institutional stress, using the declaration of a judicial emergency—a 
function of both filings and also vacant judicial seats—as a variable capturing this 
stress. From 2009 to 2010, attempts to fill vacancies to the federal judiciary 
languished, and this trend continues.11 Though the number of vacancies has since 
subsided, over the course of the previous three years there were often more than 
100 vacancies to the federal judiciary in a given month.12 The Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) considers a subset of these vacant judicial 
seats problematic enough to warrant the label “judicial emergency.”13 Vacancies 
have been a problem throughout the Obama administration, and given the 
polarized nature of the national political discourse, are likely to remain a problem 
in the future.14  
The crisis of the recent spate of judicial emergencies is, in short, a window 
allowing a glimpse through institutional stress into federal district-court outcomes. 
Exploiting the theory that judicial emergencies represent a form of institutional 
stress for the federal courts, and exploiting the fact that these emergencies for the 
first time have systematically affected the federal district courts, this Article finds 
that the relationship between the federal district courts and the federal circuit 
courts matters in a deeper way than previously thought. In particular, a statistical 
analysis of decisions finds that a judicial emergency in a corresponding circuit 
court results in more dismissals on pretrial motions. This Article also finds that this 
effect is more pronounced in larger circuits. This finding paves the way for an 
analysis of institutional stress that focuses on district-court judges as embedded 
decision makers in a hierarchy. It suggests that, under stress, district-court judges 
will work to protect the network connections and nodes along that hierarchy. 
                                                     
11 Dalhia Lithwick, Empty Chambers: Why the Judicial Vacancy Crisis Matters, 
SLATE (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/20 
10/09/empty_chambers.html [hereinafter Empty Chambers]; Dalhia Lithwick, The 
Courthouse Is Closed: Even Before the Shutdown, Federal Courts Had Already Been 
Crippled by the Sequester, SLATE (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and 
_politics/jurisprudence/2013/10/federal_courts_and_shutdown_the_sequester_had_already 
_crippled_american.html [hereinafter Courthouse Is Closed] (detailing effects of judicial 
vacancies with the recent federal shutdown); see also infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
12 See, e.g., Current Judicial Vacancies, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourt 
s.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies/CurrentJudicialVacancies.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2014) (noting that as of January 31, 2014, there were ninety-six total vacancies). 
13 The rules for the declaration of judicial emergencies are detailed below. See infra 
Part II.B. 
14 Filibuster reform may increase the speed of confirmations. But to the extent that the 
political process overemphasizes judges’ political decision making and under emphasizes 
judges’ embedded decision making and institutional constraints, filibuster reform may not 
have as strong an immediate impact. 
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This Article contributes to the literature on institutional stress and judicial 
decision making. Institutional stress is a nascent frame used to study courts and 
case outcomes. The research presented in this Article thus provides an important 
district-court companion and counterpoint to recent work on courts of appeal. In a 
recent article, Professor Bert I. Huang examined the effects of institutional stress 
on the tendency of the federal courts of appeals to grant deference to lower court 
decisions.15 By examining a period of expedited immigration board review—“a 
surge”—Professor Huang isolated the effects of an increased caseload on the 
Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit.16 Professor Huang’s narrative is one of time 
pressure: with compressed time to decide, federal appellate courts are likely to give 
more deference to a lower court, especially on questions of state law.17 Professor 
Huang posits that an increasing caseload overwhelms each judge’s decision with 
respect to the marginal value of spending extra time on aspects of a case, and 
instead the federal appellate court judge defers to a lower court’s decision.18  
Earlier research also examined judicial emergencies and the process of 
appointing judges, but none did so in the context of empirical analysis of 
institutional stress. These articles mostly focused on political dynamics in 
Congress as part of the nominating process.19 This Article expands that focus. Its 
findings have important implications for the role of federal district courts in a 
democratic and constitutional structure. The erosion of district courts as trial 
institutions, for example, erodes access to jury trials and consequently removes an 
important site for deliberative democracy. Delays and backlogs harm not only 
ordinary citizens but also the business community as it seeks other means to 
effectively and impartially resolve contract and other business disputes. This 
Article demonstrates that, under increasing institutional stress, these negative 
effects are increasing. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II explores the declaration of judicial 
emergencies by the AOUSC as an indicator of institutional stress. Examining three 
case outcomes—remands to state courts, remands to government agencies, and 
disposals on pretrial motions—this Article shows a robust statistical effect of 
institutional stress on disposals of pretrial motions. Part III details the statistical 
analysis and this effect. Part IV examines more carefully the idea of institutional 
stress to the judiciary within the framework of institutions and economics. Part IV 
then theorizes about vertical, horizontal, and chronological norms that embed 
federal district-court judges and how institutional stress can affect these norms. 
Part IV also highlights areas for additional research. Part V concludes by offering 
insight on how an institutional theory of judicial decision making could 
                                                     
15 Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (2011). Professor 
Huang also posits that judicial emergencies could be a source of institutional stress. Id. at 
1115. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 1111–13, 1118–21. 
19 See infra Part II.A. 
192 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
complement psychological, utilitarian, and political theories of judicial decision 
making. The Appendix presents more detail on the regression analysis that 
confirms other statistical analyses done in the body of the paper. 
 
II.  JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONAL STRESS AND DISTRICT-COURT OUTCOMES 
 
A.  Existing Literature on Judicial Emergencies 
 
Scholarly studies focused on judicial emergencies mostly reside in political-
science literature. Their locus of analysis is the congressional nomination process, 
which is an important part of the story. One important study linking nominations to 
vacancies was a study of the expansion of the judiciary, and congressional intent in 
doing so.20 In examining issues of the expansion of the judiciary and nominations 
to newly created seats in it, the study posits two reasons for expansion: political 
efficiency and institutional efficiency.21 Institutional efficiency rationales call for 
judicial expansion because of concerns over the efficacy of judicial decision 
making. Rising caseloads might trigger these concerns, and calls from within the 
judiciary itself for reform would also employ the rhetoric of institutional efficiency 
rationales.22 These institutional concerns thereby gesture at the effects of 
institutional stress internal to the federal judiciary. However, these studies do not 
examine the expansion’s effect on case outcomes as a metric of institutional 
efficiency.  
Vacancies in particular have been studied. But there is a tendency in earlier 
studies to focus on time-based outcome variables. A study regressing judicial 
vacancies on case disposal time and workload in the federal courts of appeals from 
1971 to 2002 finds significant effects on time to disposal of cases. The study used 
a “vacancy rate”23 measure and controls for the size of court business as measured 
by number of appeals filed, expansions in the number of judgeships, and 
percentage of newly commissioned judges.24 While this finding is interesting, it is 
not surprising: faced with vacancies, a given court of appeals will probably take 
longer to dispose of cases simply because it takes longer to hear them. Moreover, 
                                                     
20 John M. De Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & 
ECON. 435 (1996) (arguing that judicial expansion, and thus the possibility of vacant seats, 
is more prevalent in periods of political alignment among the nominating House, Senate, 
and President, as well as the enacting Senate and President).  
21 Id. 438–39.  
22 Id. at 439–44. Though, the authors note that these calls are not often heeded by 
Congress. Id. at 442–43.  
23 SARAH A. BINDER & FORREST MALTZMAN, ADVICE & DISSENT: THE STRUGGLE TO 
SHARE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 130 (2009). The study defines vacancy rate as “[dividing] 
the number of vacant judgeship-months by total judgeship months each year (that is, the 
number of authorized judgeships multiplied by twelve months) . . . .” Id.  
24 Id. 
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caseloads will necessarily rise because fewer judges result in more cases per judge. 
Also, lawyers could be litigating strategically because of vacancies. That is, repeat 
players in the courts could be filing more cases in flooded circuits in order to delay 
the case even further. There are no studies on vacancies focused on the federal 
district courts, mainly because, prior to the current political moment, nominations 
at the district-court level had never been so heavily politicized. 
These existing studies of appeals courts provide a window into how the 
political process works to respond to or delay nominations in the face of vacancies. 
They also focus on outcomes over time, but usually do not focus their analysis 
through a frame of institutional stress, and especially do not focus on the 
interactions between different levels of institutions within the federal judiciary. To 
conduct this analysis, the Article now turns to a statistical treatment of the recent 
spate of judicial emergencies. 
 
B.  Judicial Emergencies and Federal District Courts 
 
Judicial emergencies, a label applied to both federal district courts and federal 
courts of appeal, is an indicator of a court under stress. The AOUSC declares 
judicial emergencies monthly, based on a metric composed of two measures. The 
first measure is a weighted caseload statistic. The second measure is the days the 
judicial seat has been vacant. The weighted caseload statistic is a measure 
composed from calendar-year data, while the days of vacancy measure is 
continuous. For the federal district courts, the weighted caseload statistic is 
weighted filings per judgeship. The weights are assigned based on the perceived 
time and effort that it takes a judge to resolve a case: for example, in the federal 
district courts, student loan default cases are assigned a weight of 0.031 and patent 
cases are assigned a weight of 1.9.25 In the federal circuit courts the formula is less 
complicated: pro se cases are weighted at one-third of a case with counsel, 
reinstated cases are eliminated, and all other cases are weighted at one.26 These 
statistical weightings change over time to reflect the underlying realities of each 
cause of action brought in federal courts.27 
The AOUSC declares a judicial emergency in any federal circuit court where 
adjusted filings per panel of judges are over 700, or where any vacancy exceeds 
eighteen months and adjusted filings per panel of judges are between 500 and 
700.28 The AOUSC follows a similar formula for the federal district courts. The 
AOUSC declares a federal district court to be in judicial emergency if there is a 
vacancy where weighted filings exceed 600 per judgeship; there is a vacancy for 
                                                     
25 Judicial Emergencies, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAn 
dJudgeships/JudicialVacancies/JudicialEmergencies.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).  
26 Id. 
27 The measures have gone through two substantial changes, once in 1993 and again 
in 2004. Case Weights Get Update, UNITED STATES COURTS (August 2004), http://www.us 
courts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/10-10-28/Case_Weights_Get_Update.aspx. 
28 Judicial Emergencies, supra note 25. 
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more than eighteen months where weighted filings per judgeship fall between 430 
and 600; or a court has more than one authorized judgeship and only one active 
judge.29  
These judicial emergencies, though ultimately only a label, signal to the 
President and Congress a particular court in crisis.30 Despite the label’s intended 
external effect, there is some evidence that Congress ignores this signal in its 
pattern of judicial appointment.31 But there is reason to think this declaration is no 
less an informational signal for federal judges themselves; its informational effect 
is perhaps even greater. To understand this, it is necessary to understand why 
exactly a judicial emergency is an emergency. Despite the notes of alarm sounded 
by the press and academic commentators over the crisis in judicial appointments,32 
neither judicial vacancies nor judicial emergencies are new phenomena. 
But there are some unprecedented aspects of the current round of vacancies 
and emergencies that create institutional stress. Senate “[c]onfirmation rates at 18 
months into a presidency have fallen.”33 In 1982, under President Ronald Reagan, 
the confirmation rate was 93%, but under President Barack Obama this rate has 
fallen to 47%.34 Another unprecedented aspect of the recent judicial emergencies is 
the extension of vacancies and emergencies to the federal district courts.35 Never 
before have political actors engaged in such politicking around nominations at the 
federal district-court level. For example, in the Northern District of Oklahoma, 
Arvo Mikkanen’s nomination by President Obama was blocked, allegedly due to 
the failure of the President to consult with the Senators from Oklahoma, in 
                                                     
29 Id. 
30 E-mail from Susanna Byrne, Admin. Office of the United States Courts, to Daniel 
J. Knudsen (Apr. 18, 2011) (on file with author). 
31 See, e.g., RUSSELL WHEELER & SARAH BINDER, BROOKINGS INST., DO JUDICIAL 
EMERGENCIES MATTER? NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION DELAY DURING THE 111TH 
CONGRESS 1, 4–5 (2011) (“Overall, only 35 percent of district vacancies were filled in the 
last Congress, with little priority apparently given to filling the most overburdened vacant 
judgeships.”).  
32 See Lithwick, Empty Chambers, supra note 11; Litchwick, Courthouse Is Closed, 
supra note 11 (“[T]he federal justice system is in deep and worsening trouble.”); infra note 
39 and accompanying text. 
33 Bruce Moyer, Vacancy Signs at the Federal Courthouse, 57 FED. LAW. 8, 8 (2010). 
34 Id. (pointing to senatorial procedures as “secret holds” and the use of the filibuster 
to obstruct judicial confirmations to explain the drop in confirmations).  
35 ALICIA BANNON, FEDERAL JUDICIAL VACANCIES: THE TRIAL COURTS 1 (2013) 
(“District courts typically see brief peaks in vacancies after a presidential election, 
followed by a sharp decline in subsequent years. Yet, during the Obama administration, 
after district court vacancies spiked in 2009 they never returned to their previous level and, 
in fact, have grown further. For the first time since 1992, the average number of district 
court vacancies has been greater than 60 for five straight years, from 2009–2013.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
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particular Senator Coburn.36 There are many other examples reflecting a general 
trend toward obstruction under President Obama.37 Clearly, a crucial dimension to 
the current vacancy problem is the judicial nominations problem. Analyzing the 
dynamics of judicial nominations has received some scholarly attention, focused 
partly on an institutional-level analysis.38  
Prominent journalists decried these vacancies, and the emergencies that 
followed, as unacceptable in a country with a vaunted tradition of rule of law.39 
Policy institutes examined congressional failure to approve judicial nominations, 
sounding a cautionary note about political polarization.40 Scholars have also 
criticized the political aspects of the nomination process, calling on the U.S. Senate 
to halt its delay of judicial appointments.41 The executive branch itself weighed in: 
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder implored that the system “move expeditiously” 
to fill the empty judicial seats.42 Many institutional actors view these vacancies as 
troublesome. 
                                                     
36 See Andrew Cohen, The Minakken Nomination and the White Man, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 6, 2011, 12:13 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/02/the-mikkan 
en-nomination-and-the-white-man/70752/. 
37 See generally Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s Judiciary at Midterm, 94 
JUDICATURE 262 (2011) (arguing that a defiant and stubborn Republican minority in the 
Senate impeded most judicial nominations’ progress). 
38 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS 
OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 1−5 (2005); PETER C. KESTERHOFF, COURT NOMINATIONS: 
ISSUES IN NOMINATIONS AND CONFIRMATION (2009); BINDER & MALTZMAN, supra note 
23, at 58−78.  
39 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Editorial, Calling John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 
2010, 9:44 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/calling-john-roberts/?_r 
=1 (noting the problem of unconfirmed judicial appointments and “look[ing] forward to 
waking up on New Year’s Day to this headline or its reasonable equivalent: ‘Senate 
Imperils Judicial System, Roberts Says’”); Dahlia Lithwick & Carl Tobias, Vacant Stares, 
SLATE (Sept. 27, 2010, 6:39 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurispru 
dence/2010/09/vacant_stares.html.  
40 Russell Wheeler, Judicial Nomination: Into the Home Stretch, BROOKINGS INST. 
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0927_judicial_nominations_wh 
eeler.aspx (stating a “plausible explanation [for the downturn in the percentage of district 
court confirmations] is that political polarization is claiming one more of the unwritten 
rules that have traditionally sustained the federal judiciary—routine, bi-partisan approval of 
professionally competent district nominees whom both home-state senators endorse”). 
41 See, e.g., John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need 
for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 183−89 (2004); E. Stewart Moritz, 
“Statistical Judo”: The Rhetoric of Senate Inaction in the Judicial Appointment Process, 
22 J.L. & POL’Y. 341, 344−46, 392−94 (2006); Karl A. Schweitzer, Litigating the 
Appointments Clause: The Most Effective Solution for Senate Obstruction of the Judicial 
Confirmation Process, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 909, 909−11 (2010). 
42 Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice; Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 19−20 (2010) (statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the 
United States) (“There are currently 105 vacancies on the federal courts. Yet the Senate has 
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Congress has enacted a number of statutes to ensure that efficiency in the 
processing of filings and cases is maintained. For example, the Civil Justice 
Reform Act,43 passed in 1990, mandates publication of a list of motions and cases 
that are being held up by judges in the district courts, both by magistrate judge and 
district judge.44 The Civil Justice Reform Act tracks motions pending for longer 
than six months, cases pending for longer than six months, and bench trials 
submitted for decision for over six months.45 Time-to-disposition is an important 
aspect of ensuring the federal judiciary functions correctly, and efficiency is an 
important part of procedural justice. However, efficiency without quality does not 
ensure justice.  
The more interesting variables are those that detail aspects of decision making 
other than time. Courts and court processes are also “egalitarian political venues”46 
which provide a “window into the mundane” that allows for both equality before 
the law and also for the democratic function of restraining state power.47 This is 
close to the same critique made against the rise of alternative dispute resolution by 
Professor Owen Fiss, that settlement “as a generic practice” is not to be preferred 
to judgment, nor “should [it] be institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate 
basis.”48 This critique has been extended to the legalization of private processes 
dictated by the courts.49 Speed and efficiency are not the only measures of an 
effectively functioning federal judiciary. The one large institutional shift in the 
federal district courts over time has been a shift away from trials. When the federal 
rules of civil procedure were adopted, fifteen percent of cases ended with a trial; 
some sixty years later, less than three percent did, and these three percent were 
viewed as institutional “failures.”50 
On these accounts, a judicial emergency would be a form of institutional 
stress that results in fewer full trials, perhaps more motions to dismiss and 
settlements, and fewer published opinions. Indeed, published opinions have been 
                                                     
confirmed only 19 federal judges during the 15 months of this administration. That is less 
than 34% of the President’s judicial nominees and less than half the number confirmed 
during the same time period for Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush. I ask that you do 
everything possible to move expeditiously to fill the vacancies on our federal courts.”). 
43 28 U.S.C §§ 471–82 (2012). 
44 Id. § 476. 
45 Id. 
46 Judith Resnik, Courts In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 807 
(2008) (noting Bentham’s phrase that the openness of court processes “keeps the judge 
himself, while trying, under trial”). 
47 Id. at 804. 
48 Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). 
49 Judith Resnik, Essay, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the 
Death of Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 191 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he 
legalization of private processes brings with it professional domination and greater 
complexity, making these processes mimic adjudication and collapse into it”). 
50 Id. at 188–89 (noting that concepts of “right to sue” have been replaced by 
“obligations to use alternatives”). 
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proposed as one metric of what constitutes the judiciary functioning as a proper 
institution.51 Closely related to publication is the practice of “private judging,” that 
is: the unpublication, depublication, or stipulated withdrawal of opinions that result 
in these opinions largely disappearing from the public purview.52 
 
III.  STATISTICAL RESULTS  
 
The dataset used in this study is constructed from data collected annually by 
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. This study uses data from 2006 to 
2009. The unit of analysis is district court, not judge.53 The data was compiled 
from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (“ICPSR”) 
datasets (Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base) from 2006 to 2009, as well as 
data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts website on judicial 
vacancies. The dataset has 1504 observations, which are broken down by quarter 
year for each district court in the United States. It is important to note, again, that 
the unit of analysis is the district court itself, not each individual district-court 
judge. The courts range in size from small, at one to three authorized judgeships, to 
large, at up to twenty-eight authorized judgeships. There are ninety-four district 
courts in the study. Twenty-two courts, or 23% of courts in the study, never had a 
judicial emergency declared. By contrast, seventy-two courts, or 77% of the courts 
in the study experienced at least one period of judicial emergency over the study 
period, 2006 to 2009. Thirty-three of the district courts entered emergency status 
during the study period. Thirty-five district courts, by contrast, left emergency 
status during this period. Lastly, nineteen of the district courts experienced 
multiple periods of judicial emergency, entering, exiting, and entering again. 
There are three dependent variables for analysis that come from the ICPSR 
dataset: (i) a variable called pretrial, that is, the number of cases that are disposed 
of on motions before trial, and its ratio relative to the number of filings in the given 
quarter year; (ii) a variable called state remands, that is, the count of the number of 
cases that are remanded to a state court and its ratio; and (iii) a variable called 
federal agency, that is, a count of the number of cases that are remanded to an 
agency. The variable pretrial will be the focus of this Article, as it relates to a 
                                                     
51 See generally Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private 
Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1436−40 (2004) (exploring the history, 
procedures, and negative consequences of unpublished judicial opinions, noting that such 
practices give judges, clerks, attorneys, and bureaucrats the “power to declare judicial 
decisions of little or no precedential value and in some cases either to make them disappear 
from the public record or to abort them”). 
52 Id. at 1436−38. (“The apparently peculiar U.S. doctrine of precedent was created by 
the scandalous practices of private judging . . . : ‘unpublishing,’ ‘depublishing,’ and 
withdrawing judicial opinions.”).  
53 Finer-grained data on judges would make for a more detailed study of individual 
decision making. 
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number of institutional and legal questions concerning the district courts and 
adjudicative processes detailed in Section IV. 
This Article looks at six different kinds of judicial emergencies, coded as 
binary indicator variables. These emergencies are categorized by both their place 
of occurrence—district court or court of appeals—and their manner of 
occurrence—time emergencies, defined by months of vacant judgeships, or filings 
emergencies, defined by raw filings data. Time emergencies involve courts that 
have over a certain number of filings and eighteen months of a vacant judgeship. 
In the district courts, the number of filings that triggers the time emergency in the 
given month-year is 430. In the circuit courts, that number rises to 500. By 
contrast, a filings emergency occurs based on pure filings alone; a district court is 
in filings emergency if it has over 600 filings and a circuit court is in filings 
emergency if it has over 700 filings. The last two emergency variables are simply 
combinations of these measures for the two types of courts: if a court had either 
type of emergency in the given quarter year. 
Lastly, to disaggregate the sample and examine trends based on court size, 
this Article has included a measure of the district courts’ size based on number of 
judgeships. Small courts are those with fewer than ten authorized judgeships. 
Large courts are those with ten or more authorized judgeships. 
The summary statistics for these variables are presented in the table below. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max 
Circuit 1504 6.521277 3.035312 0 11 
District 1504 47.70213 27.92513 0 96 
Case 1504 672.0047 1007.801 2 17317 
State 1504 11.78125 16.02628 0 157 
Agency 1504 14.91689 27.93849 0 449 
Pretrial 1504 81.49601 83.65185 0 748 
State Ratio 1504 0.022201 0.022099 0 0.229050 
Agency Ratio 1504 0.022084 0.024714 0 0.481481 
Pretrial Ratio 1504 0.148778 0.099651 0 0.563106 
District Emerg. 1504 0.084441 0.278141 0 1 
Circuit Emerg. 1504 0.499335 0.500165 0 1 
District Time 
Emerg. 1504 0.041888 0.200400 0 1 
DFE 1504 0.042553 0.201914 0 1 
CTE 1504 0.323803 0.468081 0 1 
CFE 1504 0.175531 0.380548 0 1 
Filings 1504 3692.37 4736.458 64 48988.67 
Judgeships 1504 7.212766 5.626422 1 28 
Linear 1504 8.5 4.611305 1 16 
Small Courts 1504 0.744680 0.436185 0 1 
Large Courts 1504 0.255319 0.436185 0 1 
 
A natural set of figures to examine is the average of case outcomes, such as 
pretrial dismissals or remands to state courts, over a period of time. Such a basic 
outcome comparison cannot by itself meaningfully answer questions related to the 
effect of the declared emergencies given the many confounding variables, for 
which the analysis does not control. But it provides the starting point for a more in-
depth examination of the variables of interest. Tables 2 and 3 below provide a 
snapshot of the difference in means for the two types of emergencies. These tables 
show the difference in the means of each variable conditional on the indicator 
variable of emergencies. 
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Table 2: Comparisons Across District Emergencies 
Variable District Emergency? Mean 
Pretrial Dispositions No 77.65214 
Yes 123.1732 
Pretrial Dispositions (Ratio) No 0.1510701 
Yes 0.1239364 
State Court Remands No 10.82789 
Yes 22.11811 
State Court Remands (Ratio) No 0.0223948 
Yes 0.0201058 
Federal Agency Remands No 13.51198 
Yes 30.14961 
Federal Agency Remands (Ratio) No 0.0219398 
Yes 0.023657 
 
 
Table 3: Comparisons Across Circuit Emergencies 
Variable Circuit Emergency? Mean 
Pretrial Dispositions No 67.70252 
Yes 95.32623 
Pretrial Dispositions (Ratio) No 0.1478736 
Yes 0.1496866 
State Court Remands No 9.398406 
Yes 14.17044 
State Court Remands (Ratio) No 0.0207019 
Yes 0.0237051 
Federal Agency Remands No 11.79947 
Yes 18.04261 
Federal Agency Remands (Ratio) No 0.0201704 
Yes 0.0240043 
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Stark differences between emergency and non-emergency comparisons 
provide an illustration of the limits of pure comparative analysis. The natural 
pattern, which yields large differences between the raw numbers of pretrial 
dismissals, state court remands, and agency remands, and small differences 
between the ratios, is that large courts will be more likely to be in emergency 
groups because they have more judgeships that are possibly vacant. Moreover, 
these large courts likely have more aggregate filings, driving the number of, for 
example, pretrial dismissals even higher. These data dynamics highlight the need 
to control for various differences between the emergency and nonemergency 
groups to be able to untangle the effects of emergency status as separate and apart 
from the effects of those other differences. The most rigorous means of doing this 
is a fixed-effects regression analysis, which examines changes in pretrial numbers 
and ratios within a given court as it moves to or from emergency status. Such an 
analysis is offered in the Appendix. A more transparent and simple approach—
informed by the regression analysis and yielding results matching those in the 
Appendix—is to look at mean comparisons for subgroups of district courts that are 
at least somewhat comparable to one another. Table 4 reflects such an approach. In 
this table, district courts are categorized as “small” and “large” and the most robust 
effect from the regression analysis, the effect of circuit court filings emergencies, 
is highlighted. 
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Table 4: D
ifference In M
eans In Pretrial Ratio For Circuit Tim
e Em
ergencies 
 Sam
ple 
Circuit 
Em
ergency? 
M
ean 
Standard Error 
95%
 Confidence Interval 
Courts* 
 
Filings 
A
ll D
istrict 
C
ourts 
N
o 
0.1487915 
0.0031244 
0.1426628 
0.154920 
1504 
625989 
Y
es 
0.1487524 
0.0045213 
0.1398836 
0.157621 
384706 
Sm
all D
istrict 
C
ourts 
(Judgeships < 
10) 
N
o 
0.1580434 
0.0038486 
0.150492 
0.165594 
1120 
276107 
Y
es 
0.1319914 
0.0041652 
0.123819 
0.140163 
133651 
Large D
istrict 
C
ourts 
(Judgeships ≥ 
10) 
N
o 
0.1167752 
0.0033378 
0.1102126 
0.123337 
384 
349882 
Y
es 
0.1843158 
0.0104748 
0.1637205 
0.204911 
251055 
*Courts are the unit of observation 
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For these large courts, more geographically concentrated between districts 
and circuits (i.e., the many judges—both district and circuit—who work in the 
same court building), there is a 7% difference in the number of cases disposed of 
on pretrial motions while under emergency. 
These results are confirmed by the regression output, reported in the 
Appendix. Table A1 presents the results of regressions using a balanced district-
court fixed-effects panel. The variables for district-court judicial emergencies are 
never statistically significant on the three independent variables: pretrial 
dismissals, remands to state courts, or remands to agencies. Statistically, the 
impacts of institutional stress are weaker as a direct effect on district-court rulings. 
However, the impacts of institutional stress to federal circuit courts, vertically 
related to the federal district courts, are statistically significant. Judicial 
emergencies in the federal circuit courts are statistically significant for both the 
pretrial-dismissal and remand-to-state-court variables, with a more robust effect in 
the former. This regression result suggests that federal district-court judges are 
more likely to dispose of cases on pretrial motions if there is a judicial emergency 
in their corresponding circuit court. Moreover, this effect is present when analysis 
controls for raw number of filings. This suggests that it is not only Huang’s time-
pressure vector that is changing the behavior of judicial actors under institutional 
stress.54 Less of a pattern emerges with respect to the state-court-remand or 
agency-remand variables. 
The difference in means, the regression analysis, and the graphical 
frameworks suggest that district-court judges act increasingly as gatekeepers under 
institutional stress. That is, they might be protecting their colleagues on the federal 
circuit courts from the overwhelming amounts of cases that could go up on appeal 
with more developed records. They also could be signaling their own stress, or, 
focusing on the “big” cases to the detriment of the mundane cases.55 Alternatively, 
institutional stress may be generating a “workhorse” mentality for the judges. They 
may be trying to clear their own dockets knowing that their circuit in general is 
under stress. For one possible theory of these effects, this Article will briefly turn 
to an examination of the federal judiciary as an institution. 
 
IV.  STRESS, INSTITUTIONS, AND LEGAL THEORY 
 
A.  The Institution of the Federal District Courts 
 
Congress established the federal district courts pursuant to the U.S 
Constitution Article III, Section 1, granting a power to create “such inferior Courts 
                                                     
54 Huang, supra note 15, at 1118 (“[A] rise in time pressure might make time-saving 
options more attractive.”).  
55 See Judith Resnik, Wither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1101, 1149 
(2006). 
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as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”56 The federal district 
courts are essentially trial courts, and federal district-court judges understand 
themselves as presiding over a trial-type institution. One current issue for the 
federal district courts is the erosion of this traditional role as a forum for trials. 
Recently these vaunted courtrooms have “gone dark”: the average federal district 
judge goes nearly 300 days of the year with no trials.57 Concern over this trend is 
motivated both by the expressive importance of trials and the federal district 
courts’ role in protecting litigants’ constitutional rights.58 Connected to this is a 
perceived danger of the trial courts turning into administrative agencies: becoming 
“indistinguishable from state highway departments.”59 Federal district courts 
exhibit a two-fold institutional character: they conduct trials, and they also 
vindicate fundamental rights, often but not necessarily through the formal process 
of adjudication. 
Another institutional characteristic of the federal district courts is their 
contested institutional identity as lawmaking institutions. In one survey, over 40% 
of federal district judges thought of themselves as “policy-makers”; but 52% did 
not.60 Federal district judges do not see themselves as making much “public 
policy,” or “making the law”: 
 
On occasion, either way the law is interpreted it will have the effect of 
making law, trial judges should not attempt to make the law.61 
 
I don’t believe in judicial activism—changing the law because Congress 
has failed to do [so].62 
 
Even the district-court judges that agreed with the idea that judges make 
policy did so with reservations: 
 
Occasionally they do—it is inevitable.63 
 
Where there is no binding precedent.64 
 
To understand the federal judiciary and the district courts’ institutional 
characteristics first requires an understanding of what is meant by “institution.” 
                                                     
56 U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1. 
57 Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 746. 
58 See id. at 762. 
59 Id. 
60 KEVIN L. LYLES, THE GATEKEEPERS: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS IN THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS 20 (1997). 
61 Id.at 23. 
62 Id. at 22–23. 
63 Id. at 23. 
64 Id. 
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Institutions are prominent in economics literature, and the analysis of institutions 
has a long historical pedigree, both in economics and also in law.65 Some scholars 
focus on institutions both in their rule- and norm-creating aspects and also on their 
role of providing expectations and stability to structure coordination.66 For 
example, through signaling, the federal district courts structure coordination 
amongst the judicial hierarchy, both to the circuit courts above and also to the 
magistrates below. The other aspect of work on institutions focuses on both formal 
rules, like statutory law or contracts, as well as informal rules, such as social 
norms.67 However, this strain of scholarship focuses mostly on institutions as 
external constraints, or “rules of the game.”68 This literature defines a separate 
category—organizations embodying political bodies—like the Senate, local city 
councils, or the judiciary.69 These organizations and their structure emerge then as 
functions of the institutional framework.70  
Moreover, individuals can be seen as institutions; or more appropriately put, 
individuals work within institutions which represent “the conventions, norms and 
formally sanctioned rules of a society.”71 If the ends of behavior are only focused 
on maximization of individual utility, then “institutions can only take the form of 
external rules or constraints.”72 However, a broadening perspective that takes 
behavior as “socially contingent” also generates “an understanding . . . of 
institutions as forming the individual” and this understanding becomes “not only 
possible[, it] is necessary.”73 It is also worth noting that within the frameworks of 
                                                     
65 The early focus on institutional economics arose out of transaction costs and 
focused on legal rules to solve these problems. Later institutional work focused more on 
soft norms, culture, and social capital within institutions.  
66 See Arild Vatn, Institutions and Rationality, in ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURES: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT 113, 115 (2008) (“We are . . . living in a world 
where our actions as individuals are interdependent. Hence, what one person does 
influences other people’s opportunities. Certainly, if we were able to construct norms 
telling us how to take other people’s interests into account in specific situations, many 
conflicts could be avoided. Moreover, if these rules [were] built on common values, it 
would be easier to coordinate action. Such a process could even have the capacity to 
harmonize interests. Hence, norms can be seen as supporting common values.” (citation 
omitted)). The idea that norms, arising from institutions, support common values is key to 
understanding the judiciary. 
67 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 3–6 (1990). 
68 See id. at 4–5 (“They are perfectly analogous to the rules of the game in a 
competitive team sport. That is, they consist of formal written rules as well as typically 
unwritten codes of conduct that underlie and supplement formal rules, such as not 
deliberately injuring a key player on the opposing team.”).  
69 See id. at 5. 
70 Id. 
71 Vatn, supra note 66, at 114. 
72 Id. at 115. 
73 Id. 
206 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
norms and rules—the institutional setting—different types of rationality are at 
work. For example, individuals in an institutional setting promote trust, one of the 
values of a tightly knit institutional structure.74 Other research focuses on 
institutions as simply “common knowledge at equilibrium,” implying that 
institutional stress could upset this equilibrium and cause many unintended 
consequences.75 Institutions also have certain “scripts,” exhibiting, among other 
things, overlap costs representing scripts that are embedded in organizational 
structure.76 
The federal judiciary operates within this institutional framework as well. The 
judiciary is an institution, the same as an administrative agency, a local city 
council, a firm, or the Senate. A principle of public choice theory and institutional 
economics is that the institutional structure, and not necessarily the intent or ability 
of the individual decision maker, can incent and drive a pattern of economically 
inefficient or normatively undesirable decisions.77 Institutional norms and 
structures in a given courthouse may also drive decision making. The list of 
institutional norms here is long: informal norms of behavior; circuit effects on the 
toleration of dissent; circuit size as a measure of how frequently colleagues serve 
with one another on panels; and the individual caseloads of the judges, which 
might matter for how much “time judges have to articulate disagreement with their 
peers.”78 Greater uncertainty with regards to information about the social rules 
governing interactions is a function of size, and this both decreases reliance on 
informal rules and makes them more susceptible to shocks.79 
Judicial institutional norms have been examined before, at all levels of the 
federal judicial hierarchy. The Supreme Court remains the most studied court, and 
one that most people posit as deeply political. Some argue that dissents and 
                                                     
74 See EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC 
THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 309 (2005). 
75 See Masahiko Aoki, Endogenizing Institutions and Institutional Changes, 3 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1, 3 (2007). 
76 See Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete 
Institutionalism, 98 GEORGETOWN L.J. 863, 871 (2010).  
77 Public choice theory makes this point in a way more akin to those in the legislative 
branch, but it could apply equally well to judges. See Edward J. Lopez, An Introduction to 
The Pursuit of Justice, in THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS 1, 4 (Edward J. Lopez ed., 2010) (“The institutional structure, not the bad 
politician, is the root cause of economically inefficient policies such as pork barrel 
spending. Thus, in order to achieve fewer bad policies, public choice analysis would 
suggest institutional change—divorcing representation from geography, for example.”). 
78 VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 38–40 (2006). 
79 JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 176 (1992) (“Socially shared 
knowledge is mainly a product of shared experience: As the number of actors increases, the 
likelihood that a person will have ongoing interactions with the same actors declines. The 
effect here is to decrease reliance on informal rules to establish expectations.”). 
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concurrences on the Supreme Court are shaped by informal consensual norms.80 
Others have found that the agenda-setting process—the policy-making function of 
the Court—is also shaped by informal and institutional norms.81 Scholars have also 
made the argument that the political nature of the Supreme Court is overstated.82 
However, with the small number of cases that the Court takes, as well as these 
cases’ presumed legal difficulty, it is not surprising that judgments on the Court 
shade toward overt political choices, or at least appear to do so. 
Scholars have also studied the federal circuit courts. In studying the norms of 
the federal circuit courts, the two most prominent areas of focus are panel effects, 
in which the votes of judges are influenced by their colleagues on the panel,83 and 
the elevation of federal district-court judges to the appellate bench. However, 
related to institutional norms, only recently have scholars examined the reasons 
that panel effects arise in the first place. Two mechanisms have been proposed to 
explain the existence of panel effects: deliberative and strategic explanations.84 
Deliberative explanations are those that occur because of “dynamics internal to the 
members of a panel” and can encompass persuasion through reasoned argument, 
the exchange of information, or conformity or group pressures.85 By contrast, 
strategic explanations are those that occur by taking into consideration likely 
responses by other actors.86 In the case of the federal courts of appeals the 
“preferences of the Supreme Court” and the “circuit as a whole” are taken into 
consideration rather than just the three judge panel.87 Ultimately, this examination 
                                                     
80 Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms in 
the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874, 900 (1998) (“[W]e demonstrate that the 
patterns of dissents and concurrences on the Court for the past two centuries are consistent 
with the existence of ‘consensual norms’ which, to varying degrees over time, have 
restrained the justices from engaging in overt conflict.”). 
81 See Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely, The Supreme Court and the DIG: An 
Empirical and Institutional Analysis with Michael E. Solimine, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1421, 
1440. 
82 Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—And the Nation’s, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 6–8 (2006). 
83 FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 9 (2007) 
(“This collegiality effect appears to be at least as powerful as the individual judge’s own 
preferences.”). A series of studies have explained panel effects. Richard Revesz’s study on 
environmental cases in the D.C. Circuit found that a colleague’s ideology was a better 
predictor of a vote than the judge’s own ideology. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1717–19 (1997). 
Subsequent studies also verified the presence of panel effects. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., 
supra note 7, at 22. 
84 Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: 
An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1324–27 (2009). 
85 Id. at 1325. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1326. 
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finds that the strategic considerations matter more than the internal dynamics.88 
This division, between strategic and internal dynamics, forms the penumbra of a 
theory of embedded judging. But these studies are nowhere extended to the federal 
district courts.  
In the federal courts of appeals several institutional roles could also shape the 
opinions of judges and case outcomes. Chief judges in a position of “institutional 
authority” would be more wary of dissenting opinions, which differ over outcome, 
as a threat to “collegial relations among judges” than they would be of concurring 
opinions, which differ over legal reasoning only.89 Moreover, younger judges or 
federal district-court judges elevated to serve on appellate panels may be less likely 
to dissent or concur.90 
In viewing the judiciary as an institution, from the Supreme Court to the 
federal courts of appeals to the federal district courts, a key aspect becomes 
institutional stability. Assuming arguendo formal rules as well as informal rules 
and norms combine to compose an institutional equilibrium, then exogenous 
shocks to institutions can realign or alter these fundamental equillibria. 
Institutional change is the obverse of institutional stability, and institutional stress 
orthogonal to both of these. 
Institutional stress, especially prolonged institutional stress of the kind 
signified by a judicial emergency, could interfere in important ways with these 
interactions. For one thing, this current round of judicial emergencies has 
extended, for the first time, to the federal district courts. In this sense, current 
judicial emergencies have upset not only the horizontal institutional equilibrium 
but also the vertical equilibrium. Horizontal institutional equilibrium is probably 
put to the test here. Judges on the federal circuit courts are likely aware that the 
federal district courts are also suffering from vacancy problems.  
In short, under institutional distortions or stresses, informal rules proliferate 
and alter or replace more formal decision-making structures.91 This could have an 
impact on institutional actors’ decision-making processes and their effective 
identity within the court system. A prima facie assumption in this analysis then 
becomes that individuals are not free of the constraints of their social and 
institutional settings when making decisions. This seems at once uncontroversial 
and controversial. The claim that social institutions affect decision making is 
uncontroversial because the counterfactual is nearly impossible to imagine: 
                                                     
88 Id. at 1375 (“Both minority and majority judges on ideologically mixed panels 
differ in their willingness to vote counter-ideologically, depending upon how the circuit as 
a whole is aligned relative to the panel members. These results are consistent with the 
theory that circuit judges behave strategically with an eye to circuit en banc review.”). 
89 HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 78, at 38. 
90 Id. 
91 See FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 74, at 28–30 (“For formal institutions (so-
called made orders) key questions are: what set of informal rules will grow into the gaps in 
the formal institutional framework and how long will the spontaneous growth process 
continue?”). 
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everyone is embedded within a set of social structures, both subtle and powerful, 
and an individual makes many decisions in the context of these structures. The 
claim that social institutions affect decision making is controversial because 
individuals often resist the notion that their decisions are in any way shaped by 
institutions we occupy. 
 
B.  Federal District Judges as “Embedded” 
 
Though not a central focus of this research, this Article also demonstrates the 
incompleteness of judicial decision-making literature. Much of this literature either 
analyzes judges as political decision makers or, in the case of panel effects, as 
psychological decision makers who are affected by their colleagues. However, this 
Article also highlights the idea that judges decide as embedded individuals. That is, 
any attempt to isolate judges as purely atomistic decision makers fails to take into 
account an important determinant of their decision making. To take just one 
example, on the Supreme Court, perhaps the most political court in the country, 
there is a surprisingly complex camaraderie, and the institution itself likely shapes 
and alters the justices’ own perceptions and exercise of choice.92 Federal circuit 
courts and federal district courts display this institutional character as well.93 
On this theoretical view, judges are “embedded” actors in both their 
respective circuits and in the judiciary as a whole.94 This embeddedness affects 
how the judges may make decisions, and institutional stress could alter this 
embeddedness in a variety of ways.95 In thinking about the judiciary as a social 
                                                     
92 Consider the numerous stories of Justice Brennan’s influence on voting. See 
generally HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR (1995). 
Consider also the recent health-care case, where Chief Justice Roberts is posited by many 
to be voting not purely on political lines but also with an important focus on the 
institutional character of the Supreme Court. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: It Is 
Kennedy’s Call (FINAL UPDATE 3:14 pm), SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 27, 2012, 5:41 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/argument-recap-it-is-kennedys-call/ (noting that Chief 
Justice Roberts might find “institutional imperatives for going along if a majority were 
formed to uphold [the Affordable Care Act]”). 
93 For example, the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, to pick just two, have 
vastly different institutional characters. 
94 See Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 595–600 (2000) (defining four levels of institutional 
economics). 
95 For example, Professor David Dequech articulated the following influences on 
institutions: 
 
At least three types of influence can be identified. The first, which may be 
called the restrictive function of institutions, consists in their role as constraints 
on economic behavior. This is the type of influence emphasized by neoclassical 
economists and many new institutional economists. I therefore agree with 
DiMaggio’s description of most economists as being among those who prefer to 
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institution, it is helpful to think about the different interactions in the judiciary 
along which institutional and individual preferences can shape one another. 
Briefly, there are three ways to organize and understand embeddedness: horizontal 
embeddedness, vertical embeddedness, and chronological embeddedness. 
These three interactive categories constitute a nascent framework for linking 
the literature on institutional stress with the literature on judicial decision making. 
The first interactive category might be horizontal, that is, connections that form 
between colleagues inside the institution itself. This is best exemplified by the 
concept and study of panel effects.96 Another example of this relationship might be 
collegiality; for example, some have argued for splitting the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals because the large number of active judgeships—twenty-eight—
discourages the judges from making good faith efforts to deliberate with each other 
to reach outcomes.97 The second interactive category might be vertical, that is, 
salient relationships with other institutions that are directly above or below one’s 
own. In the context of the judiciary, it might be the case that there are important 
formal, informal, political, and procedural relationships between the various 
“inferior” courts established by Congress. For example, the relationship between 
the traditionally liberal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court has 
been detailed as particularly contentious, yet no doubt permeated by informal 
                                                     
stress how culture, in its regulatory forms, constrains behavior. The second type 
of influence refers to the cognitive function of institutions, which is related to 
the (strictly) cognitive aspects of culture. The cognitive function refers, first, to 
the information that institutions provide to the individual, including the 
indication of the likely action of other people. I call this the informational-
cognitive function of institutions. Second, the cognitive function of institutions 
includes also their influence on the very perception that people have of reality, 
that is, on the on the way people select, organize, and interpret information. I 
call this their deeper cognitive function. Institutions perform a third function 
through their influence on the ends that people pursue. For want of a better term, 
this can be called their motivational, or teleological, function. This function is 
related to the valuative aspect of culture and to the identification of culture as 
providing values. I would now like to explicitly add a fourth function, through 
which institutions influence the emotions guiding economic behavior. This 
emotional function is related to the expressive, or affective, aspects of culture. 
 
David Dequech, Cognitive and Cultural Embeddedness: Combining Institutional 
Economics and Economic Sociology, 37 J. ECON. ISSUES 461, 463–64 (2003) (emphasis 
omitted) (citations omitted). 
96 Panel effects are defined as the “votes of judges [being] significantly influenced by 
the party affiliation of the president who appointed the other two judges on the panel.” 
SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 22. 
97 E.g., Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and 
Effects of Decision-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 
659, 660 (2007). 
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expectations on both sides.98 Verticality can also be permanent or temporary. 
When a federal district-court judge is temporarily elevated to a seat on the federal 
circuit court, they sit with circuit judges. Federal district-court judges are elevated 
in this way, in part, on a rationale of encouraging “orientation to the circuit.”99 
Each circuit, it would seem, has its own institutional character. These types of 
relationships also exist between courts and agencies, especially in repetitive 
situations. For example, the EPA might have a particularly important relationship 
with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in which it litigates a majority of its cases. 
The elevation of district-court judges explicitly authorized to sit on appellate 
benches embodies this horizontal interaction, quite literally, in its movement. The 
third interactive category might be chronological: Not only are judges embedded 
in space but they are also embedded in time. Institutions have memories and 
inertias and judges judge in these chronological spaces as well.  
These interactive categories, perhaps, inform a different kind of institution 
that lies between two well-established categories. Currently, some economists 
distinguish between economic and political institutions.100 Economic institutions 
are categorized as “those that really shape the economic incentives” and “create 
opportunities or incentives for investment and innovation.”101 Economic 
institutions “are crucially related to how level the playing field is,” and this 
leveling is often informed by “property rights and contracting institutions . . . .”102 
By contrast, political institutions control the “specific distribution of political 
power in society.”103 These two categories are of course interactive, and this 
interaction requires thinking about “economic institutions situated in the context of 
the political institutions and in particular of the political institutions that support 
and make these economic institutions durable.”104 
To these two institutional types might be added legal institutions. Legal 
institutions are those that embed individual decision makers into a complicated 
series of mutable constraints: chronological, interpersonal, and doctrinal. Legal 
                                                     
98 The Ninth Circuit makes up the overwhelming number of cases considered in the 
Supreme Court. SCOTUSBLOG, END-OF-TERM STATISTICAL ANALYSIS—OCTOBER TERM 
2010, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/SB 
_Summary_Memo_OT10.pdf (“The Court once again considered more cases from the 
Ninth Circuit than it did from any other court—26 of 82 cases (32%).”). 
99 Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 10, at 573 (noting a tendency also to encourage 
district court judges to serve on an appellate panel “within six months to a year of their 
appointment”). 
100 Daron Acemoglu, The World Through Institutional Lenses, Conversations, EDGE 
(Sept. 12, 2012), http://edge.org/conversation/the-world-through-institutional-lenses (noting a 
broad definition of institutions as “the set of humanly designed constraints that shape 
human behavior” and outlining efforts of two scholars to add “clarity and discipline” to the 
concept by distinguishing “between economic and political institution”). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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institutions thus make political institutions durable, and may also facilitate the 
legalization and stability of economic institutions. As this Article has shown, stress 
to legal institutions along these three dimensions, and perhaps others, can have an 
important systematic effect on outcomes. The aspects distinguishing legal 
institutions from political and economic institutions, while gestured at in much 
institutional research, deserve far greater treatment by legal academics and social 
scientists. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This Article has posited that institutional stress, here measured by a court 
being in judicial emergency, has an effect on individual decision making, 
measured as case outcomes. In particular, the results of a fixed-effects regression 
analysis indicate that judicial emergencies in the federal circuit courts have a 
statistically robust effect on judicial decision making in the federal district courts. 
In particular, an emergency in its corresponding federal circuit court makes it 
statistically more likely that cases will be disposed of through pretrial motions in 
federal district court. A simple difference in means approach confirms this result, 
and suggests that this effect is actually occurring robustly in larger district courts. 
The size of the district courts thus affected suggests that important institutional 
relationships are in play. 
This Article points to further fruitful directions for research. A more unique 
question in the context of the federal district courts would be the extent to which 
institutional stress affects the more prosaic decisions in the course of a trial: rulings 
on evidentiary motions, discovery, and similar outcome-steering choices. Another 
question is whether institutional stress holds true for administrative agencies, both 
in adjudication and in informal rule making. The bright-line rule for judicial 
emergencies suggests that a regression discontinuity design could serve as a 
potential fertile area of research. Lastly, a study that would layer judges within 
courts, and statistically investigate relevant characteristics of each, would be 
interesting and valuable. 
Theoretically, this finding suggests that traditional theories of judicial 
decision making that focus on individual psychology,105 individual political 
                                                     
105 The work of Professor Jeffrey J. Rachlinski is indicative of this approach. See 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1195–97 (2009) (finding that in criminal cases “judges harbor the 
same kinds of implicit biases as others; that these biases can influence their judgment; but 
that given sufficient motivation, judges can compensate for the influence of these biases”); 
see also Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie, & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
1251, 1258–60 (2005) (using an experiment to prove that judges often cannot ignore 
inadmissible information outside the record). 
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disposition,106 or judicial utility107 should be augmented and refined by an 
emerging literature considering individual decision making in the context of 
institutional or social norms.108 Judges are often viewed simultaneously as 
individuals with political and moral preferences as well as individuals necessarily 
insulated from public opinion and cloaked with institutional majesty in order to 
dispense justice and uphold the rule of law. Though a judge’s decisions may be 
tied to political pressures, the overabundance of study of the Supreme Court may 
skew the perception of judges as political decision makers. Certainly, the justices 
on the Supreme Court decide difficult legal questions that may only have political 
answers dependent on highly contested versions of the public good. However, 
from the perspective of the federal judiciary, lower federal courts are equally 
important: they are the federal trial courts and record shapers. This research 
suggests that judges in district courts may operate in a different manner than those 
on the Supreme Court. In short, a model of decision making for the district courts 
derived from individualistic decision making models and shorn of vertical 
institutional context fails to capture the complex reality of lower court judicial 
decision making. 
  
                                                     
106 This frame for analyzing judicial decision making has a long pedigree. See, e.g., 
Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges’ Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
843, 843–46 (1961) (exploring “empirical relationships between [political party affiliation] 
and fifteen areas of judicial decision-making”). For more modern work in this area, see 
SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 19–22 (finding “strong evidence” of ideological voting 
based on partisan affiliation of appointing president). 
107 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 135–36 (1995) (providing a 
formal model for judicial utility); Resnik, supra note 55, at 1149 (noting that the “‘big’ 
case” becoming the “centerpiece of adjudication” means that “many life-tenured judges 
[become] restless with the ordinariness of other cases and [become] reluctant to invest time 
and resources in them.”).  
108 See, e.g., Daniel Martin Katz & Derek K. Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social 
Network Analysis of the Federal Judiciary, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 457, 504 (2010) (“Our 
emphasis on judicial ‘peer effects’ is an attempt to fill the void in these respective theories, 
arguing the existing social structure of the hierarchical federal judiciary in part explains 
how an existing set of individual micro-motives map to the aggregate macro-behavioral 
judicial outcomes.”). 
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APPENDIX — REGRESSIONS 
 
For Tables A1 and Tables A2 below I specify the following two general 
regressions:  
 
(1) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
(2) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
i indexes the district court and t indexes quarter-year. There are three 
dependent variables Yit: Pretrial, State, and Agency. The variable Pretrial is a count 
of the number of cases that are disposed of on motions before trial. The variable 
State is a count of the number of cases that are remanded to a state court. The 
variable Agency is a count of the number of cases that are remanded to an agency. 
Only Pretrial is reported in the following tables, though the estimates for the others 
are available upon request.109 
There are six independent variables: district and circuit emergencies, and 
disaggregated district and circuit time and filings emergencies. District Time 
Emergencies, DTE, is an indicator variable which takes a value of one for those 
district courts that are in an emergency in the given month and year because they 
have over 430 filings and a judicial vacancy of over eighteen months. District 
Filing Emergencies, DFE, is an indicator variable which takes a value of one for 
those district courts that are in emergency because they have over 600 weighted 
filings per judgeship. The variables labeled “Circuit”, CTE and CFE, have the 
same structure as their district-court analogues; the time variable takes a value of 
one for those Courts of Appeals in the relevant Circuits that are in emergency in 
the given month and year because they have over 500 adjusted filings and a 
judicial vacancy of over eighteen months. The filings variable, CFE, takes a value 
of one for those Courts of Appeals in the relevant Circuits that have over 700 
filings. The variables DEit and CEit take a value of one if the federal district 
(circuit) court is in either a time or filings emergency at the start of the given 
quarter-year.  
There are three control variables: raw filings, a linear control that starts at one 
and increases by one for each district court in each subsequent month and year, and 
a district court (or circuit court) fixed effect, αi. Filings is simply the aggregate 
number of filings each court received in a given month and year and attempts to 
control for more active and flooded courts. The variable Linear is employed to 
assure that the trends are not simply associated with the time period they occur in; 
i.e., filings are not uniformly increasing over the relevant period of study. 
                                                     
109 Note that these regression tables do not report the regressions for the remand to 
state courts or to federal agencies. These tables showed less significance in general, but are 
available upon request. 
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Following Professor Bert Huang, I will use the court as the primary unit of 
analysis.110 There is little extant literature examining the district courts as 
institutions, and few studies point the way to controls. Here I have followed 
closely Bert Huang’s Lightened Scrutiny. I examine only civil cases and exclude 
habeas and prisoner suits, and below I run the regressions with fixed effects for the 
federal district courts.111 Parallel to Professors Binder and Maltzman, I have added 
a control for the size of each court’s docket by adding the number of cases filed.112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
110 See Huang, supra note 15, at 1116. 
111 Id. at 1147. 
112 See BINDER & MALTZMANN, supra note 23, at 133. 
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Table A1: District Court Fixed-Effects Regressions 
Independent 
Variables 
Pretrial 
Ratio Pretrial Ratio 
Pretrial 
Ratio 
Pretrial 
Ratio 
District Emergency 
-0.00615 -0.00615     
-0.00556 -0.00556     
Circuit Emergency 
0.0169*** 0.0170***     
-0.00394 -0.00395     
District Time 
Emergency 
    -0.0115 -0.0115 
    -0.0081 -0.0081 
District Filing 
Emergency 
    -0.00344 -0.00343 
    -0.00703 -0.00703 
Circuit Time 
Emergency 
    0.00867 0.00884 
    -0.00625 -0.00633 
Circuit Filings 
Emergency 
    0.0192*** 0.0192*** 
    -0.00417 -0.00417 
Linear 
-0.000367 -0.000355 -0.000295 -0.000291 
-0.00027 -0.000271 -0.000273 -0.000274 
Filings 
  -4.88E-07   -1.95E-07 
  -1.11E-06   -1.13E-06 
Constant 
0.144*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 
-0.00332 -0.00502 -0.00333 -0.00504 
Observations 1504 1504 1504 1504 
R-squared 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.019 
Number of Districts 94 94 94 94 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2: Circuit Court Fixed-Effects Regressions 
Independent 
Variables 
Pretrial 
Ratio 
Pretrial 
Ratio 
Pretrial 
Ratio 
Pretrial 
Ratio 
District Emergency 
-0.0144 -0.0114     
-0.00884 -0.00895     
Circuit Emergency 
0.0249*** 0.0259***     
-0.00723 -0.00724     
District Time 
Emergency 
    0.00713 0.0089 
    -0.0122 -0.0122 
District Filing 
Emergency 
    -0.0373*** -0.0337*** 
    -0.0121 -0.0122 
Circuit Time 
Emergency 
    0.0113 0.0129 
    -0.0119 -0.0119 
Circuit Filings 
Emergency 
    0.0286*** 0.0293*** 
    -0.00762 -0.00762 
Linear 
-0.00037 -0.000343 -0.000451 -0.000424 
-0.000517 -0.000516 -0.000521 -0.000521 
Filings 
  -1.13e-06**   -1.01e-06* 
  -5.47E-07   -5.48E-07 
Constant 
0.141*** 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 
-0.00622 -0.0064 -0.00624 -0.00642 
Observations 1504 1504 1504 1504 
R-squared 0.011 0.013 0.017 0.019 
Number of Circuits 12 12 12 12 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
